publicações

2025

1. Remembering and Imagining as Attitudes: An Interpretivist View

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Synthese

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   The (dis)continuism problem asks if episodic memory is continuous with imagination. Given its close proximity with the cognitive sciences, philosophers have traditionally taken this issue as part of a larger naturalistic framework in the philosophy of memory. Some philosophers have argued that such naturalistic methodology entails the need for philosophers to also take the mental attitudes of remembering and imagining into account. However, the naturalistic methodology is concerned with making ontological claims on the basis of the relevant explanatory terms inside the framework of the empirical sciences. It is unclear whether attitudes have such a role in the cognitive sciences, specially cognitive neuroscience. Without such an account of their relevancy, one could argue that it is unlikely that "remembering” and "imagining” have any significant role in naturalistic philosophy. Such is the exclusion argument. In this paper, I offer an account of how mental attitudes indirectly correspond to neural mechanisms to show how the exclusion argument is not sound. This account, named interpretivism, not only supports pluralism about (dis)continuism, but also indicates how empirical and epistemic meanings of "remembering" could be integrated in our thinking about memory.

   @article{DieselWerberich2025,
     author = {Diesel Werberich, Matheus},
     journaltitle = {Synthese},
     title = {Remembering and Imagining as Attitudes: An Interpretivist View},
     date = {2025},
     volume = {205},
     number = {162},
   }

2023

1. Top-down and bottom-up constraints in mechanistic inquiry

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Controversia (Unisinos)

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   Mechanisms play a crucial role in scientific research across various disciplines, and philosophers of science have devoted significant effort into understanding their ontology and epistemology. This paper examines the relationship between mechanisms and phenomena, highlighting the inherent dependence of mechanistic delineation on the characterization of phenomena. By acknowledging that characterizing phenomena is influenced by pragmatic considerations and research interests, the paper argues that mechanistic inquiry is inherently shaped by researchers’ perspectives. This dependence raises concerns about the possibility of a realist view of mechanisms. To address these concerns, the paper explores how top-down constraints, rooted in researchers’ interests and pragmatic concerns, can be balanced by bottom-up constraints derived from empirical considerations. In conclusion, I argue that the interplay between these constraints forms an empirical and realist counterweight to the perspectival nature of top-down constraints.

   @article{DieselWerberich2023,
     author = {Werberich, Matheus Diesel},
     journaltitle = {Controversia (Unisinos)},
     number = {3},
     title = {Top-down and bottom-up constraints in mechanistic inquiry},
     volume = {19},
     date = {2023},
     pages = {87 - 106},
   }

2020

1. A Metacognitive Approach to Memory Markers

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Aporia

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   Given both the phenomenological and cognitive similarities between episodic memory and imagination, it’s difficult to say how we can reliably distinguish them at their moment of retrieval. Several memory markers have thus been proposed, which are characteristics that would reliably indicate to the subject that her mental state is an instance of memory. While the question of what exactly constitutes these memory markers is still an issue to be settled, there is also the more general question of whether they can be reliable at all. In the present paper, I have identified two theses about the latter issue (the reliability and unreliability theses) and have argued that the main cause of disagreement between them lies on their different assumptions on how beliefs about our own mental states are formed, i.e. what are the underlying metacognitive mechanisms responsible for self-attribution of mental states. These different views on metacognition were then further investigated with regards to their use of metarepresentations and their general agreement with recent cognitive psychology research. These analyses corroborate the reliability of certain kinds of memory markers in distinguishing between memory and imagination.

   @article{Werberich2020,
     title = {A {{Metacognitive Approach}} to {{Memory Markers}}},
     author = {Werberich, Matheus Diesel},
     date = {2020},
     journaltitle = {Aporia},
     volume = {XX},
     pages = {19--30},
   }

2. Como Ensinar Filosofia Em Uma Educação Maior: Uma Análise Bourdieunana Do Sistema de Ensino

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Revista Digital de Ensino de Filosofia - REFilo

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   No presente artigo, constata-se o modo como o ensino de filosofia no Brasil, visto como educação maior, é utilizado como ferramenta da inculcação de um arbitrário cultural a partir de uma análise bourdieuana do sistema de ensino. Chegou-se à conclusão que a prioridade conferida ao texto clássico de filosofia no ensino médio é um modo de reprodução das mesmas estruturas sociais que permitem a impossibilidade de ascensão social. Com isso, é proposta uma educação menor, cuja constituição fundamental é a relação entre professor e aluno, capaz de subverter as características da educação maior. Para tanto, foram analisados os textos de Sílvio Gallo (2002; 2006), os quais apontam para a valorização do capital cultural dos alunos, o incentivo à criação autônoma de conceitos e escolha de autoras e autores não canônicos como ferramentas de subversão dos mecanismos da educação maior.

   @article{Werberich2020a,
     title = {Como Ensinar Filosofia Em Uma Educação Maior: Uma Análise Bourdieunana Do Sistema de Ensino},
     shorttitle = {Como Ensinar Filosofia Em Uma Educação Maior},
     author = {Werberich, Matheus Diesel},
     date = {2020},
     journaltitle = {Revista Digital de Ensino de Filosofia - REFilo},
     shortjournal = {Rev. Dig. Ens. Filo.},
     volume = {6},
     pages = {2},
     issn = {2448-0657, 2448-0657},
     doi = {10.5902/2448065739401},
     urldate = {2022-11-15},
   }

2019

1. O Dilema Presentista

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Em curso

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   The aim of the present paper is to show that presentism cannot answer the truthmaker objection in a satisfactory manner. For such, two main categories of presentist solutions were studied: the first kind states that truthmakers can’t provide any objection to presentism, while the second type tries to ground past truths by postulating new ontological categories, which were rejected, mainly because of their use of ad hoc ontologies. Also, I showed how the presentist should adopt antirealism about the past in case she wants to maintain a simple ontology. Being that said, I conclude that presentism cannot offer satisfactory truthmakers to past truths.

   @article{Werberich2019,
     title = {O Dilema Presentista},
     author = {Werberich, Matheus Diesel},
     date = {2019},
     journaltitle = {Em curso},
     volume = {6},
     number = {1},
     pages = {105--114},
   }