Matheus Diesel Werberich

selected publications

1. Remembering and Imagining as Attitudes: An Interpretivist View

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Synthese

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   The (dis)continuism problem asks if episodic memory is continuous with imagination. Given its close proximity with the cognitive sciences, philosophers have traditionally taken this issue as part of a larger naturalistic framework in the philosophy of memory. Some philosophers have argued that such naturalistic methodology entails the need for philosophers to also take the mental attitudes of remembering and imagining into account. However, the naturalistic methodology is concerned with making ontological claims on the basis of the relevant explanatory terms inside the framework of the empirical sciences. It is unclear whether attitudes have such a role in the cognitive sciences, specially cognitive neuroscience. Without such an account of their relevancy, one could argue that it is unlikely that "remembering” and "imagining” have any significant role in naturalistic philosophy. Such is the exclusion argument. In this paper, I offer an account of how mental attitudes indirectly correspond to neural mechanisms to show how the exclusion argument is not sound. This account, named interpretivism, not only supports pluralism about (dis)continuism, but also indicates how empirical and epistemic meanings of "remembering" could be integrated in our thinking about memory.

   @article{DieselWerberich2025,
     author = {Diesel Werberich, Matheus},
     journaltitle = {Synthese},
     title = {Remembering and Imagining as Attitudes: An Interpretivist View},
     date = {2025},
     volume = {205},
     number = {162},
   }

2. Top-down and bottom-up constraints in mechanistic inquiry

   Matheus Diesel Werberich

   Controversia (Unisinos)

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   Mechanisms play a crucial role in scientific research across various disciplines, and philosophers of science have devoted significant effort into understanding their ontology and epistemology. This paper examines the relationship between mechanisms and phenomena, highlighting the inherent dependence of mechanistic delineation on the characterization of phenomena. By acknowledging that characterizing phenomena is influenced by pragmatic considerations and research interests, the paper argues that mechanistic inquiry is inherently shaped by researchers’ perspectives. This dependence raises concerns about the possibility of a realist view of mechanisms. To address these concerns, the paper explores how top-down constraints, rooted in researchers’ interests and pragmatic concerns, can be balanced by bottom-up constraints derived from empirical considerations. In conclusion, I argue that the interplay between these constraints forms an empirical and realist counterweight to the perspectival nature of top-down constraints.

   @article{DieselWerberich2023,
     author = {Werberich, Matheus Diesel},
     journaltitle = {Controversia (Unisinos)},
     number = {3},
     title = {Top-down and bottom-up constraints in mechanistic inquiry},
     volume = {19},
     date = {2023},
     pages = {87 - 106},
   }